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The Constitutionality of the EPA's
Enforcement of CERCLA: Big Business
Challenges and a Small Business Problem
Scott Corley*
Abstract
With the Deepwater Horizon oil drill disaster in 2010 and the disaster
at Japan's Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant in 2011, more attention
has recently been focused on the government's role in responding to and
recovering from environmental disasters. In the U.S., the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) is
one of the statutes that allows the EPA to respond to environmental
pollution and the inappropriate disposal of hazardous wastes. Businesses
have long claimed that CERCLA goes too far in the power it grants the
EPA to order private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites, and this
Note explores the newest claim that the courts have been asked to consider
in this debate: whether the EPA's pattern and practice of enforcing the law
is unconstitutional because (1) it subjects companies to the imposition of
such high fines and severe penalties that they have no choice but to comply
with the law, or because (2) the EPA fails to provide adequate procedural
protections to businesses assessed with environmental liabilities.
This Note highlights three criteria that are likely required for a
successful constitutional challenge to CERCLA: (1) the challenging parties
must be deprived of interests that go beyond the purely financial; (2)
challenging parties must be completely precluded from any preenforcement review; and (3) the delay of judicial review must actually
cause the complete preclusion of judicial review. After highlighting these
factors, the Note examines the ironic result that the entities that have
challenged CERCLA most fervently are entities that have the weakest case
for a potentially successful challenge to the statute. The Note goes on to
suggest that there is a class of businesses and entities affected by the statute
that have a much stronger constitutional claim, but that members of this
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011 at Washington and Lee University School of Law. This
Note was prepared as part of Professor Hari Osofsky‘s Seminar on Climate Change and
Environmental Law. Thank you to Professor Osofsky for her comments and feedback and
for all of the members of the Journal of Energy, Climate, and Environment for their help
with preparing this essay for publication.
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class of businesses have been unable to mount serious challenges to the
statute because of the severe costs and penalties they would face if they
denied an EPA order.
In order to deal with this problem, this Note suggests that courts, when
considering a pattern and practice challenge to CERCLA, should ask
whether there is a class of businesses whose constitutional rights to due
process are infringed when they are assessed environmental liabilities
without any chance to challenge them. In the alternative, the EPA or
Congress should establish either official rules or legislation that prevent
the agency from assessing environmental liabilities against smaller, more
vulnerable businesses until after the business has an opportunity to make its
case before a neutral third-party decision-maker.
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I. Introduction
In 1995, Congress took up the task of amending the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)1 in
order to provide relief for some small businesses and individuals who could
be driven out of business or into bankruptcy by the harsh terms of the law.2
While Congress did not pass any amendments to CERCLA until 2001, one
of the stories used in the Senate in 1995 showed the problems faced by
small businesses under the law, and, perhaps unknowingly, illustrated what
may be the strongest argument that the EPA's pattern and practice of
enforcing CERCLA violates Due Process. In October of 1995, Senator
Larry Pressler of South Dakota brought the Senate's attention to the plight
of one of his constituents that had recently been featured in the Wall Street
Journal.3
Senator Pressler focused on Bill Huebner, the owner of Ace Steel and
Recycling in Rapid City, South Dakota.4 In 1991, Mr. Huebner received a
letter from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) demanding that his
company pay $47,000 for the clean-up of a former battery recycling site in
Nebraska that had been contaminated by battery lead and acid.5 These
contaminants had been released into the environment between 1940 and
1982, and the area was declared a hazardous waste site under CERCLA in
1991.6
Mr. Huebner asserted a litany of problems with the order, namely that
his company did not even exist until 1989 and had never sent a single
battery to the recycling site.7 But the fact is that if the EPA had sought to
impose this liability on Mr. Huebner's business despite the apparent
unfairness, it is likely that he never would have had an opportunity to
1. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006) (providing the EPA with the authority to direct potentially
responsible parties to clean up hazardous waste sites that had resulted from significant
industrial pollution).
2. See 141 CONG. REC. S15844 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler)
(providing the statements of Senator Pressler on Superfund Reform and the importance of
providing a liability shield for small businesses).
3. See id. (providing the full text of Bill Huebner, My Superfund Nightmare, Wall St.
J., Oct. 26, 1995).
4. See id. (discussing Mr. Huebner‘s receipt of a letter from the EPA ordering him to
pay $47,000 to clean up a hazardous waste site that was contaminated by a company that
had little, if any connection, to Mr. Huebner‘s business).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.

264

2 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 261 (2011)

challenge the EPA's decision before a neutral decision-maker.8 Like Mr.
Huebner, thousands of businesses, small and large alike, have been
threatened with billions of dollars of hazardous waste site clean-up costs
under the act, and as a result, the question of whether the EPA's
administration of the act violates Due Process has been brought to the
courts repeatedly throughout the years.9 Though almost all such challenges
have been struck down by the courts that have considered them,10 the
purpose of this Note is to draw attention to a particular context of the EPA's
pattern of enforcement under CERCLA, which has possibly been
overlooked by the courts.
This Note suggests that the strongest argument that can be made
concerning the constitutionality of the EPA's enforcement of CERCLA
arises when environmental liabilities are imposed on small businesses.
Ultimately, this context provides the clearest evidence that certain
provisions of CERCLA have been enforced in a way that has violated the
Due Process rights of certain potentially responsible parties (PRPs).
In a 1997 article in the New York Law Journal about the viability of
constitutional challenges to CERCLA, the authors posited that such attacks
8. See id. (stating that if the EPA had not removed the threat of liability, the business
owned by Mr. Huebner would have been unable to continue operations); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607 (providing for potential liability for a very broad class of persons who are affiliated
with any hazardous waste site including for any person who "arranged for disposal . . . of
hazardous substances" at the site); Aselda Thompson, Comment, Exposing a Gap in
CERCLA Case Law: Is there a Right to Recover Costs Following Compliance With an
Administrative Order After Atlantic and Aviall, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1679, 1683 n.18 (2010)
(describing the four categories of persons who can be named as PRPs under CERCLA).
9. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson (General Electric IV), 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 17
(D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting General Electric‘s claim that the EPA‘s enforcement of CERCLA
violates Due Process under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)), aff’d Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Jackson (General Electric V), 610 F.3d 110, 127–29 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that GE had
standing to bring a pattern and practice claim and that district court had jurisdiction over the
claim but finding that EPA's pattern and practice of administering the statute did not violate
Due Process); City of Rialto v. W. Coast Loading Corp., 581 F.3d 865, 877–78 (9th Cir.
2009) (describing Goodrich‘s challenge to the EPA‘s enforcement of CERCLA under the
Due Process Clause and holding that the court did not have jurisdiction over the claim);
United States v. Capital Tax Corp., 2007 WL 488084 *3 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (asserting a
constitutional challenge to the EPA‘s enforcement of CERCLA under the Due Process
Clause); Raytheon v. U.S.A. 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1156 (D. Kan. 2006) (accepting the
EPA‘s argument that Raytheon lacked standing to challenge the EPA‘s pattern and practice
of enforcing CERCLA using the Due Process Clause).
10. See e.g., General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 39 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding
that EPA‘s pattern and practice of enforcing CERCLA has not violated Due Process); City
of Rialto v. W. Coast Loading Corp., 581 F.3d 865, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (agreeing with the
D.C. District Court that the EPA‘s pattern and practice of administering CERCLA did not
violate Due Process).
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in the future were likely to succeed only where: first, the property interest
infringed by the government is not strictly monetary; second, the statute
calls for a complete lack of pre-deprivation procedures; and third, the
statute's purported delay of review actually results in the complete
preclusion of review.11 After a brief introduction to CERCLA's statutory
framework,12 this Note will use those three elements as a starting point to
show how the EPA's assessments of liability against small businesses in the
last twenty years presents the strongest evidence that the agency's
enforcement of CERCLA is unconstitutional in at least some contexts.13
The next section will focus on why the most recent court challenges to the
EPA's use of unilateral administrative orders (UAOs) under CERCLA,
including the decade-long challenge that has been brought by the General
Electric Company (GE),14 are unlikely to alleviate the problems faced by
small businesses under the statute.15 The final section will explore potential
solutions to this problem including, first, the potential that small businesses
will have a constitutional right to greater procedural due process recognized
by the courts in a pattern and practice challenge; and second, the options
available for the EPA or Congress to establish constitutional rules
governing the enforcement of environmental liabilities against small
businesses.16
II. CERCLA's Framework and Enforcement Against Small Businesses
The statutory scheme of CERCLA is one that has been covered in
great detail in both cases and by commentators in law review notes and
11. Michael B. Gerrard & Deborah Goldberg, Constitutional Challenges to CERCLA,
N.Y.L.J. May 23, 1997, at 3 (1997).
12. Infra Part II.
13. Infra Part IV.B.
14. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA (General Electric II), 360 F. 3d 188, 194 (D.C. Cir.,
2004) (holding that the district court erred in dismissing GE‘s facial challenge to CERCLA);
General Electric IV, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (holding that EPA‘s pattern and practice of
enforcing CERCLA did not violate the Due Process Clause under either Ex parte Young or
Matthews v. Eldridge); General Electric V, 610 F.3d at 129 (affirming the district court's
decision in General Electric IV that neither the CERCLA statute itself nor EPA's pattern and
practice of enforcing the statute were unconstitutional); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson (General
Electric III), 362 F. Supp. 2d 327, 344 (D.D.C. 2005) (granting EPA's motion to dismiss
GE's textual challenge to CERCLA but also concluding that GE pled a "pattern and practice"
claim that was not barred by the statute's jurisdictional limitations); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Whitman (General Electric I), 257 F. Supp. 2d 8, 31 (D.D.C. 2003) (granting the EPA‘s
motion to dismiss GE‘s initial claims that the EPA‘s enforcement practices under CERCLA
violated Due Process) overruled by General Electric II.
15. Infra Part IV.
16. Infra Part V.
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articles,17 so this Note will only discuss the basics concerning the statute
and the provisions that have most recently been alleged to violate Due
Process. After discussing the statutory framework, this section will also
discuss why the three elements of a successful constitutional challenge to
CERCLA are unlikely to be present when the act is enforced against large
corporations.18
A. The Nature of CERCLA
CERCLA was originally passed in 1980 to ensure a "prompt and
effective response to problems of national magnitude resulting from
hazardous waste disposal."19 Because of the high costs of cleaning up a
hazardous waste site, Congress sought to ensure that the amount of federal
funds that would be used to clean up sites under the act would be
minimized,20 and the enforcement mechanisms of CERCLA were designed
to ensure that the polluter of a site would pay for its clean-up.21 Many
commentators and courts have stated that the liability imposed under
CERCLA is retroactive, strict, and joint and several for any responsible
party.22 Under CERCLA, then, once the EPA has determined that a
17. See generally General Electric IV, 595 F .Supp. 2d 8, 11–12 (D.D.C. 2009)
(describing the EPA process for assigning liability under CERCLA); General Electric II,
360 F.3d at 189–90 (discussing the legislative reasoning for enacting CERCLA); General
Electric I, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 12–14 (laying out the CERCLA framework); General Electric
III, 362 F. Supp. 2d 327, 330–331 (providing background on the CERCLA framework); See
also David H. Topol, Hazardous Waste and Bankruptcy: Confronting the Unasked
Questions, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 185, 189–92 (1994) (describing the allocation of clean-up
costs under CERCLA); Michael P. Healey, The Effectiveness and Fairness of Superfund’s
Judicial Review Preclusion Provision, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 273–85 (1996) (describing
the structure of CERCLA cleanups and the structure of CERCLA enforcement).
18. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
19. Healey, supra note 17, at 273 (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp.,
546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)).
20. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2009) (describing
Congress‘s intentions in enacting CERCLA as ensuring that responsible parties clean up
hazardous waste sites and that the decontamination be done efficiently and expeditiously)
(citations omitted).
21. See Id.(describing Congress‘s intention that the parties responsible for the
pollution at a hazardous waste site would either clean it up themselves or pay the costs of
clean-up) (citations omitted).
22. See Healey, supra note 17, at 281 ("[Section 107(a)] has been uniformly
interpreted as imposing retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability on responsible
parties.") (citations omitted); see also Elizabeth Ann Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are there
any Defenses Left?, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 385, 393 (1988) (summarizing the way the
courts have been encouraged to accept an expansive view of liability under CERCLA so that
liability is strict, is applied retroactively, is applied without regard to culpability or fault, and
is joint and several).
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hazardous waste site exists and determines the potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) who were responsible for the pollution at the site, the next
step for the EPA is to determine which parties to hold liable for the
pollution and how to ensure that the party or parties responsible pay for the
clean-up of the site.23
B. The Options for Remediation
CERCLA provides the EPA with three basic options once it
determines the parties responsible for the release of pollutants at a
hazardous waste site.24 The first and most controversial provision, § 106 of
CERCLA,25 gives the EPA authority to issue UAOs directing private
citizens or corporations to clean up hazardous waste sites when the agency
determines that that party was responsible for the contamination.26 If the
PRP complies with such an order, then the site is cleaned up, and the PRP
may seek to recoup some of its costs through contribution actions filed
against other parties who are also responsible for the pollution at the site, if
it can identify them.27 If the party believes it was misidentified by the EPA
as the party responsible for the pollution but still complies with the order to
clean up the site, it can then challenge the EPA's order identifying it as the
responsible party and seek reimbursement for clean-up costs directly from
the EPA.28
While the above process sounds fairly simple and straightforward, in
practice it takes years to complete, and the EPA generally pursues a number
of alternative remedies before issuing a UAO. 29 The first thing the EPA
does after it determines that an entity is a PRP for a particular hazardous
waste site is send the party a "general notice letter" that notifies the entity of

23. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (noting that once PRPs are
identified the EPA will initiate negotiations with them to begin clean up).
24. See id. (outlining the three options the EPA has if negotiations fail).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2006).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2006) (granting the President, through the EPA, the
authority to take action through any order necessary to protect the public welfare and the
environment); accord General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)
("EPA‘s third option is to issue a unilateral administrative order (UAO) under section 106,
ordering PRPs to clean up a site.").
27. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b))
(stating that a PRP that complies with an order may seek contribution from other PRPs or
from the EPA itself).
28. Id.
29. See id. at 29 (describing the process EPA now uses before issuing a UAO).
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its liability for the site and its expected contribution.30 This was likely the
type of letter that Ace Steel and Recycling received, which prompted the
Wall Street Journal editorial by Bill Huebner that Senator Pressler read into
the Congressional Record.31 After a general notice letter is sent, the PRP is
allowed to submit comments to an administrative record.32 This record is
compiled by the EPA, but the EPA does not allow any neutral decisionmaker to review the record until after a site cleanup is complete.33
After a general notice letter is sent to a PRP and after the PRP has
some chance to submit a response in the form of comments to the
administrative record, the EPA conducts settlement negotiations with the
PRP in an effort to come to an agreement regarding the PRP's contribution
to the cleanup.34 Then, if settlement negotiations fail, a UAO may be
issued.35 Perhaps in an effort to avoid due process concerns, the EPA
claims that it often allows PRPs to contribute less than the cost of the
cleanup if the PRP would suffer "undue financial hardship" if forced to pay
the full amount or if forcing the party to pay the full amount would be
inequitable.36
Now if a PRP is not persuaded to clean up a hazardous waste site and
will neither settle with the EPA nor comply with a UAO directing it to
clean up the site, then the second option for the agency is to conduct the
cleanup itself and seek reimbursement from PRPs afterwards.37 In order to
protect public funds, when the EPA conducts the clean-up itself, Congress
has authorized the agency to seek treble reimbursement and fines of

30. See id. ("EPA provides notice to potential PRPs through a ‗general notice‘
letter.").
31. See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.
32. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 29 (D.D.C. 2009) ("PRPs then again
have the opportunity to respond to general notice letters and provide information regarding
liability and remedy selection.").
33. See id. (describing the process of making an administrative record after a general
notice letter has been sent out).
34. See id. (asserting that the settlement negotiation process is a lengthy one).
35. See id. ("Finally, at the end of this lengthy process and only if negotiation fails,
EPA will normally issue a UAO.").
36. See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-658, ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITIES: EPA SHOULD DO MORE TO ENSURE THAT LIABLE PARTIES MEET THEIR CLEANUP
OBLIGATIONS 7 (2005) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05658.pdf (describing
the EPA‘s settlement procedures when a PRP lacks sufficient resources to pay for the entire
cost of a cleanup at a hazardous waste site).
37. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2))
("PRPs may seek reimbursement upon completion of the cleanup if they believe that they
have been issued a UAO in error.")
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$32,500 per day that the PRP failed to comply with the EPA's order.38 The
possibility of treble damages and massive fines provide an extremely large
incentive for companies to comply with all UAOs issued by the EPA, and
the vast majority of companies do comply.39
Finally, in the third and least controversial provision of CERCLA, the
EPA can seek an order in U.S. district court compelling an identified party
to conduct the clean-up of the site.40 While this option technically remains
available to the EPA, at least one PRP has claimed that the EPA has
abandoned this enforcement method altogether.41 According to that PRP,
the EPA has not instituted an enforcement action in district court since the
late 1980s, when a number of district courts refused to defer to the agency's
judgment and instead reviewed the EPA's selected remedial action under
CERCLA de novo.42 When such review occurred, the courts allegedly
often rejected the remedies that EPA sought.43
C. CERCLA's Limits on Judicial Review of EPA Action
The last statutory provision of CERCLA that will be discussed in this
section is the provision that acts to limit judicial review of the EPA's
enforcement actions.44 In addition to providing for the ability of the
government to issue powerful orders and seek heavy fines forcing PRPs to
clean up hazardous waste sites, CERCLA also limits the ability of PRPs to
challenge such orders by delaying any review of such orders until after a

38. See id. at 11–12 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b), 9607(c)(3), 9611(a)) (describing
EPA‘s options under CERCLA if negotiations with a PRP over a hazardous waste site fail to
result in action being taken by the PRP to clean up the site).
39. See id. at 23, 28 (stating that evidence of publicly-traded companies refusing to
comply with UAOs is scarce and that of the 1638 PRPs who have been issued UAOs most
recently, there have been 75 instances of noncompliance, a rate just over 4%).
40. Id. at 11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)).
41. See General Electric Co.‘s Mot. for Summ. J. and Mem. of Law in Supp. Thereof
at 33–34, General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 00-2855), 2007 WL
5022421 (asserting that after the cases of United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460 (W.D.
Okla. 1990) aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992) and
United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990) were decided against the
EPA, the agency stopped bringing judicial enforcement actions under § 106 of CERCLA).
42. See id. (discussing the outcome of United States v. Hardage, 633 F. Supp. 1280
(W.D. Okla. 1987) where the court subjected the EPAs remedy to a de novo review).
43. See id. ("EPA‘s experience with direct judicial actions in the late 1980s and early
1990s demonstrates that when district courts have the opportunity to provide meaningful
review, EPA‘s selected remedy is often rejected.")
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2006) (setting forth the timing of review under
CERCLA).
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hazardous waste site is decontaminated.45 Thus, if a PRP wished to
challenge a specific order issued by the EPA, it would either have to
comply with the order and spend large sums of money to decontaminate a
hazardous waste site and then challenge the EPA's order in district court, or
it would have to first refuse to comply with the order and subject itself to
the potential for treble damages and large fines, then wait for the EPA to
complete the clean-up and bring an enforcement action against the PRP,
and only then could the PRP assert any defenses or counterclaims it may
have against the agency.46 Either way, the average time it takes to complete
remedial action at a hazardous waste site is currently about three years,
which means that for the average remediation, any EPA actions under
CERCLA will be unreviewable by any third-party for at least three years.47
Now, just because review of specific agency action is delayed until the
completion of remedial action does not mean that the judicial review
provisions delay all challenges to the statute. Rather, courts have generally
been willing to hear facial challenges to the constitutionality of CERCLA,
and at least one court has interpreted the judicial review provision to allow
jurisdiction over other broad challenges to the act that fall short of a facial
challenge.48 In General Electric Co. v. Johnson (General Electric III),49 the
45. See General Electric II, 360 F.3d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (describing how
§ 113(h) of CERCLA bars judicial review of challenges to a § 106 order until after remedial
actions are completed).
46. See id. at 193 (stating that the plain language of § 113(h) of CERCLA bars preenforcement judicial review of agency action under §§ 104 and 106(a) of CERCLA); see
also Raytheon v. United States 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1156 (D. Kan. 2006) (finding the
court lacked jurisdiction over Raytheon‘s constitutional challenge of an EPA order under
CERCLA because the EPA had not issued a formal notice stating that Raytheon had
completed its clean-up responsibilities at the site, which was required for the company to
seek reimbursement from the government under CERCLA).
47. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 31 (D.D.C. 2009) (giving three years
as the average time it takes to complete remedial actions under CERCLA and going on to
state that there is no evidence that the EPA waits to bring enforcement actions to delay a
party‘s opportunity for review).
48. See General Electric III, 362 F. Supp. 2d 327, 344 (D.D.C. 2005) (concluding that
GE had pled a "pattern and practice" claim that EPA's administration of the statute was
unconstitutional and that this claim survived the judicial review provision of CERCLA);
General Electric II, 360 F.3d at 194 (holding that the judicial review provision does not bar
a court from considering a facial or systemic challenge to CERCLA); Reardon v. United
States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1515 (1st Cir. 1991) (determining that § 113(h) of CERCLA does not
bar a constitutional challenge to the CERCLA statute itself).
49. See General Electric III, 362 F. Supp. 2d 327, 344 ("[T]he Court concludes that
GE has also pled a ―pattern and practice‖ challenge to EPA's administration of CERCLA,
which survives the jurisdictional limitation of section 113(h)."). General Electric III was a
continuation of GE's constitutional challenge to CERCLA. Id. at 330. In the case, EPA
argued that GE was simply attacking the facial validity of the statute. Id. Because a facial
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U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia determined that GE
presented a "pattern and practice" challenge to the EPA's administration of
the statute, and the court further determined that it could take jurisdiction
over that claim without violating CERCLA's jurisdictional limitations.50
The court therefore ruled that GE could proceed with its claim that the
EPA's "pattern and practice" of enforcing CERCLA was unconstitutional.51
This type of claim acknowledges the facial validity of the statute as written
but challenges that the EPA‘s systematic enforcement of CERCLA is
unconstitutional.52
While that case was a major victory for GE because it allowed the
corporation to continue with its challenge, it has not been definitively
settled that the judicial review provision of CERCLA does in fact allow
such a challenge.53 In fact, after that case, the U.S. District Court in the
attack requires a party to show that a statute is unconstitutional in every application, EPA
argued that summary judgment was proper because the statute is at least constitutional when
applied in an emergency setting. Id. However, GE argued that its pleadings asserted both
that the statute was facially unconstitutional and that the EPA's "pattern and practice" of
enforcing the statute was unconstitutional. Id. The EPA relied on the facts that GE filed a
single-count amended complaint challenging the constitutionality of the statute and that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had previously remanded the case so the court
could "address the merits of GE's facial due process claim." Id. at 333. According to the
EPA, this was evidence that the court should only consider the statute's facial validity. Id.
However, the court viewed GE's pleading liberally and determined that the company
provided enough notice to the EPA that it intended to press both a facial challenge and a
"pattern and practice" challenge. Id. The court then turned to determining whether GE's
pattern and practice challenge could proceed under that circuit's precedent. Id. at 334.
According to the district court, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's opinion
remanding the case drew a line between systemic and particularized challenges. Id. at 334–
35. In this case, GE's challenge was not to any particular order and would not delay any
environmental clean-up. Id. at 335. Therefore, the district court concluded that the court of
appeals would not bar GE's pattern and practice claim in the case, as it was a systemic
challenge rather than a particularized one. Id. at 336. Because GE did in fact plead the
pattern and practice claim and the district court believed the circuit court would allow the
claim to proceed, the court concluded by allowing GE to proceed with that claim after
granting EPA's motion for summary judgment on the facial validity of the statute. Id. at 344.
50. Id. at 336.
51. See General Electric III, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 344 (concluding that GE did plead a
pattern and practice claim, that the claim was not barred by the limitations on judicial review
found in § 113(h) of CERCLA, and that GE could proceed with discovery on that claim).
52. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 13–14 (portraying GE‘s claim as one
that asserts that the EPA‘s enforcement of CERCLA violates the Constitution in fact, even if
the statute is not unconstitutional in theory).
53. See U.S. v. Capital Tax Corp. 2007 WL 488084, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(disagreeing respectfully with the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia's decision
in General Electric III that past application of an allegedly unlawful practice can confer
jurisdiction over a claim for future injunctive relief).
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Central District of California, for one, refused jurisdiction over a similar
pattern and practice claim, and its decision and interpretation of the judicial
review provision of CERCLA was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.54 More recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit agreed that challenges to EPA's "pattern and
practice" of enforcing CERCLA were not necessarily barred by CERCLA's
provisions limiting judicial review,55 but the court, in that case,
distinguished the Ninth Circuit opinion on the grounds that GE, unlike the
plaintiff in California, could establish that it had suffered past injury and
continued to suffer from threatened future harm from EPA's pattern and
practice of enforcing CERCLA without relying on third parties.56
D. The Constitutionality of the General Framework
In conclusion, CERCLA's framework provides heavy incentives for
businesses and individuals to comply with orders from the EPA in the form
of potential treble damages and heavy fines.57 Additionally, by delaying
review until a clean-up has been completed, the EPA has been able to
respond to hazardous waste sites promptly and ensure that such areas are
cleaned up as quickly as possible.58 When applied to big businesses,

54. See City of Rialto v. W. Coast Loading Corp., 581 F.3d 865, 867 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide a claim that the EPA‘s pattern
and practice of enforcing CERCLA violated the plaintiff‘s Due Process rights); accord
United States v. Capital Tax Corp., 2007 WL 488084, at *6 n. 2 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (stating that
a plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the EPA‘s pattern and practice of enforcement under
CERCLA when the plaintiff cannot show that it could expect another UAO from the EPA);
Raytheon v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1154 (D. Kan. 2006) (pointing out that
while many circuit courts have considered the availability of jurisdiction over such "pattern
and practice" claims, only one district court has ever determined that a challenge of the
EPA‘s enforcement of CERCLA is a legitimate challenge). But see General Electric V, 610
F.3d 110, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("Although we thus read [General Electric II] as holding
only that the district court had jurisdiction over GE's facial challenge, we nonetheless agree
with GE that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain its pattern and practice claim as
well.")
55. See General Electric V, 610 F.3d at 125 (agreeing with GE that the district court
had jurisdiction over GE's pattern and practice claim when the claim did not seek relief from
any particular UAO).
56. See id. at 127 (mentioning both GE's involvement in response actions at 79 active
CERCLA sites and the possibility for the future issuance of UAOs to GE as reasons for the
court's decision that GE has standing to challenge the EPA's pattern and practice of
enforcing CERCLA).
57. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
58. See United States v. City and County of Denver, 100 F.3d 1509, 1513–14 (10th
Cir. 1996) (stating that the purpose behind the provisions limiting judicial review is to
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CERCLA works well, and it ensures that hazardous waste sites are cleaned
up as quickly as possible, that the costs are borne by private parties instead
of the federal government, and that the businesses can be reimbursed if
others have also contributed to the pollution at a site or if it turns out that
the EPA made a mistake in attempting to impose liability on the company
in the first place.59
With that in mind, this Note suggests that the enforcement of
CERCLA against big businesses, even through the use of UAOs, is not
likely to rise to the level of a constitutional violation for a number of
reasons. First, even though there are few, if any, pre-deprivation
procedures provided, the property interests that the businesses are deprived
of tend to be purely financial, i.e., the cost of the cleanup, a depressed stock
price, and decreased brand value.60 Second, because the provisions which
delay review are unlikely to completely preclude review for big businesses,
the enforcement of CERCLA against them is more likely to be
constitutional.61 In other words, big businesses have an actual opportunity,
if they wish, to challenge orders that direct them to clean up a site or to seek
contribution from other responsible parties.
Unfortunately for small businesses, when a UAO is issued to them or
when an environmental liability is assessed under CERCLA through a
general notice letter, these provisions can deprive the business and its
owners of more than purely financial interests.62 Additionally, the
CERCLA provisions that purport to only delay review may actually operate
to eliminate any possibility of review if a small business cannot survive

prevent time-consuming litigation and allow the EPA to focus on the primary goal of
CERCLA, which is the "prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites").
59. See infra part IV.A. (discussing the financial and other effects large businesses
face when assessed environmental liabilities and explaining why the EPA has a strong case
that the procedures in place under CERCLA are sufficient to protect the affected property
interests or larger companies).
60. See General Electric V, 610 F.3d at 128 (stating that no procedural protections are
required under GE's arguments because any harms to a company's stock price, credit rating,
or brand value are consequential damages and not "constitutionally protected property
interest[s]"); cf. General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 30 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that the
deprivations GE complained of were purely financial deprivations, and that these
deprivations were less serious because they could be recouped in a post-deprivation
hearing).
61. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 38 ("If the PRP complies, then the
average costs of compliance are $4 million and the deprivation lasts for an average of three
years. If the PRP does not comply, then the average size and length of the deprivation are
substantial but unclear.")
62. See id. at 30 (noting that for some PRPs, the issuance of a UAO could result in a
variety of collateral effects including putting the PRP out of business).
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under looming environmental liabilities for a period that can extend for
multiple years.63
III. The EPA's Pattern and Practice of Enforcement Against Small
Businesses
A. Deprivation of Small Business's Property Rights
Now that it is clear how the EPA enforces CERCLA and how potential
constitutional problems arise in the course of that enforcement generally,
this section of the Note will focus on the constitutional problems that arise
when the EPA uses CERCLA to assess environmental liabilities against
small businesses. Returning to the elements likely to be present in a
successful due process challenge to CERCLA, the first is to show that the
issuance of a UAO to a small business deprives that business, or the owners
of the business, of important private property interests that go beyond
purely financial interests.64 If it were possible to find the number of
businesses that are forced either to declare bankruptcy or to cease
operations because of the assessment of an environmental liability under
CERCLA, this would be fairly clear evidence of a weighty private property
interest that goes beyond a purely financial deprivation.65 Quite simply,
business owners whose environmental liabilities contribute to or directly
cause their business's failure may be entirely deprived of their ability to
earn a living for an indefinite period of time.
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that any remotely clear empirical evidence
exists that shows the number of businesses that experience this situation.
Even though there is little clear evidence on this point though, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, in General Electric Co. v.
63
See id. at 32 (noting that expert evidence was presented in the case that suggested
an average of eight years between the identification of a hazardous waste site and the
issuance of a UAO and an average of four years between the selection of remedial measures
and the issuance of the UAO).
64. See Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 11 (citing Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d
1509, 1515 n.10, 1520 (1st Cir. 1991)) ("[A] new challenge is most likely to be successful
where the statutory provision deprives a PRP of property interests that are not strictly
monetary."); accord General Electric V, 610 F.3d 110, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("[N]othing . . .
implies that consequential injuries, standing alone, merit due process protection.").
65. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (recognizing that a substantial
financial deprivation that has collateral effects on a company‘s operations is not a purely
financial deprivation); but see General Electric V 610 F.3d at 119–20 (disagreeing with GE's
argument that government actions that subject individuals or corporations to consequential
injuries but that do not subject those individuals or corporations to deprivations of liberty or
property interests are limited by procedural due process).
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Jackson (General Electric IV),66 still recognized that UAOs could put some
PRPs out of business.67 Moreover, the court also recognized that such a
result would deprive that party of a private property interest that is
weightier than the purely financial interests of which GE was deprived.68
This finding may be particularly relevant to any future challenges after the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's
opinion in General Electric Co. v. Jackson (General Electric V)69 that held
66. General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 39 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding that
businesses assessed environmental liabilities under CERCLA do not have a procedural right
to a pre-issuance hearing under the Due Process Clause). In this case, GE was challenging
the EPA's "pattern and practice" of enforcing CERCLA. Id. at 10. GE claimed that the
EPA's aggressive enforcement of the statute and the severe punishments available thereunder
essentially forced PRPs to comply with the statute in violation of the rule laid out in Ex
Parte Young. Id.at 14. GE also claimed that the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge
required greater procedural protections than those allowed for under the statute because of
the substantial property interest that companies could be deprived of through CERCLA. Id.
The court, however, rejected both of GE's arguments. Id.at 11. The district court dismissed
GE's challenge under Ex Parte Young because it found that the statute allowed for a
"sufficient cause defense" and because penalties and fines could only be imposed by an
Article III judge, and not by the agency itself. Id. at 17–18. As for the company's challenge
under Mathews v. Eldridge, the court decided that the high cost of providing additional
procedural safeguards are not required under CERCLA because it is unlikely that such
additional procedures would reduce an already low risk of error. Id. at 38. Therefore, the
court rejected both of GE's constitutional arguments and granted EPA's motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 39.
67. See id. at 30 ("UAOs could put some PRPs out of business.")
68. Id. at 30–31.
69. See General Electric V, 610 F. 3d 110, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming the district
court's decisions that PRP's are not entitled to greater procedural protections under CERCLA
and that CERCLA is facially constitutional).
GE again challenged CERCLA's
constitutionality under both Ex Parte Young and Mathews v. Eldridge. Id. at 113. GE
presented essentially the same arguments as it had in General Electric IV that the EPA's
pattern and practice of enforcing CERCLA forced PRPs to comply with the statute without
challenging it and that the level of procedural protections provided by the EPA was
inadequate considering the size of the private property interest implicated by environmental
enforcement actions. Id. Like the district court, the circuit court first assessed the
constitutional challenge under Ex Parte Young and determined that CERCLA did not violate
the rule of Ex Parte Young because the statute included a "sufficient cause" defense and
because fines and penalties can only be imposed on PRPs through an Article III judge. Id. at
118–19. The court then turned to address GE's claims that the statute was unconstitutional
because of the way it can harm companies' stock price, brand value, and cost of financing.
Id. at 119. The court determined that such harms were only "consequential injuries," which
do not merit any type of due process protection. Id. at 120. Finally, the court addressed
GE's "pattern and practice" challenge. Id. at 124. It determined that the district court did
have jurisdiction over GE's pattern and practice challenge and that GE had standing to bring
the challenge. Id. at 125–27. However, the court quickly ruled against GE based on its prior
determination that the injuries GE suffered to its brand value, stock price, and cost of
financing were not injuries to interests that are entitled to constitutional protection. Id. at
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that the injuries GE suffers because of CERCLA are only consequential
injuries and, therefore, are not constitutionally protected.70
The district court's declaration in General Electric IV that the
assessment of environment liabilities could put some PRPs out of business
was premised on the acceptance of expert testimony presented by an
economist for GE.71 In a counterfactual that the expert created for the
purposes of the GE litigation, he found that roughly 7% of the fictional
companies that refused to comply with a UAO in his study were driven
completely out of business by the environmental liability and another 7% of
businesses had their value reduced by at least half.72 Besides this
counterfactual and expert testimony showing that the EPA's issuance of
UAOs will force some businesses to completely shut down, a study
conducted by the General Accounting Office when CERCLA was first
being implemented included a statement that the EPA projected that as
many as 30% of the companies issued UAOs under CERCLA could be
forced into bankruptcy.73
A more recent study by the Government Accountability Office found
it impossible to determine with any certainty the number of businesses that
have been forced into bankruptcy by the issuance of a UAO or notice letter
from the EPA.74 However, the report did state that from 1998–2003, the
Justice Department pursued environmental liabilities stemming from
CERCLA in 100 different bankruptcy proceedings.75 By combining this
128.
Having disposed of all of GE's arguments, the court affirmed the trial court's
decisions. Id. at 129.
70. See id. at 119–24 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the injuries to GE's stock price,
brand value, and ability to secure financing and concluding that those interests are not
constitutionally protected liberty or property interests).
71. See General Electric IV at 30–31 ("UAOs could put some PRPs out of business.
For other PRPs, UAOs may affect operations, like whether to bid for new projects or to hire
additional employees. Yet for other companies, like GE, UAOs are not material to financial
positions, results of operations, or liquidity.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
72. See Expert Report of John Geweke ¶¶ 21–22, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F.
Supp. 2d 8, (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 00-2855), 2007 WL 6148045 (stating that of 290 firms in
the counterfactual who did not comply with the EPA‘s order, 21 had their value reduced to
zero and another 7.6% of firms had their value reduced by at least 50%).
73. See Topol, supra note 17, at 191 ("EPA has projected that thirty percent of all
hazardous waste site owners will be forced to file for bankruptcy." (citing U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED 86-77, HAZARDOUS WASTE: ENVIRONMENTAL
SAFEGUARDS JEOPARDIZED WHEN FACILITIES CEASE OPERATING (1986))).
74. See U.S. GOV‘T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 36, at 17–18 (stating that
the number of businesses in bankruptcy with environmental obligations is not known).
75. See id. at 18–19 (stating that of the 112 bankruptcy proceedings in which the
Department of Justice pursued environmental liabilities from 1998–2003, 100 of the
proceedings involved liabilities incurred under CERCLA).
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information and some information from General Electric IV, it may be
possible to gain a general idea of the number of companies who receive
UAOs that end up in bankruptcy. These calculations are not meant to
provide any specific conclusions concerning the number or types of
businesses that are deprived of important property interests through the
enforcement of CERCLA; rather they are intended to provide a general idea
of the extent of the collateral effects of the enforcement of CERCLA
against small business owners, which may be helpful in understanding the
nature of the property interest at stake for some businesses in future pattern
and practice CERCLA litigation.
In General Electric IV, the court stated that the EPA issued 5,422
UAOs to companies between 1982 and 2006.76 The GAO report stated that
the Justice Department pursued CERCLA liabilities in 100 bankruptcy
proceedings from 1998–2003.77 Although the evidence shows that the rate
of issuance of UAOs has increased during the last 15 years, this Note will
assume, for simplicity's sake, that the rate of issuance of UAOs was
constant over the 24 year period mentioned in General Electric IV and that
the GAO report's findings are indicative of a pattern where about 100
companies assessed CERCLA liabilities end up declaring bankruptcy every
five years.78
Using those assumptions, it is possible to estimate that in the period
from 1982 to 2003, 4,571 businesses were issued UAOs and 420 of those
businesses ultimately went bankrupt.79 420 businesses out of 4,571 equals a
bankruptcy rate of just over nine percent. While it is likely that many, if
not most or all, of these companies were driven into bankruptcy by factors
76. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 28 (D.D.C. 2009) (mentioning that of
the 5,422 UAOs issued in that time period, there were 189 instances where a PRP did not
comply with the order).
77. See U.S. GOV‘T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 36, at 18–19 (stating that
100 of the proceedings in which the Department of Justice pursued environmental liabilities
from 1998–2003 involved CERCLA liabilities).
78. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 33 n. 17 (referencing an expert report
prepared for the litigation that shows that the rate of issuance of UAOs has not been constant
but has instead increased in the past 15 years).
79. See id. at 8 (giving 5,422 as the number of UAOs that were issued between 1982
and 2006). 5,422 UAOs issued over 25 years from 1982 through 2006 equates to roughly
217 UAOs issued to businesses each year. If 217 UAOs are assumed to be issued each year
from the beginning of 1982 through the end of 2003, that would mean that 4,571 UAOs were
issued over the entire 22 year period. Assuming that 100 businesses with environmental
liabilities declared bankruptcy in every five-year period, then between 1982 and 2003, 420
businesses would have declared bankruptcy over that 22 year period. See U.S. GOV‘T.
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 36, at 18–19 (stating that 100 companies in bankruptcy
had environmental liabilities arising out of CERCLA during the five-year period from 1998–
2003).
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in addition to their environmental liabilities,80 these numbers do illustrate
that there is a class of businesses for which the effects of environmental
liabilities incurred through CERCLA include forced bankruptcy or
dissolution.
For another illustration of this point, one need only look to the Wall
Street Journal article presented to the Senate in 1995 by Senator Pressler. 81
The article points out that Mr. Huebner's business in South Dakota was
assessed a liability under CERCLA of $47,000, an amount greater than the
company's profit for the entire year.82 Had the EPA sought to enforce the
liability, the article makes clear that given the limits imposed by CERCLA's
judicial review provisions, Mr. Huebner would have been driven out of
business with no chance to challenge the EPA's determination of liability.83
While the EPA has argued, and some courts have accepted, that the
deprivations faced by GE, like fluctuations in a company's stock price,
reputational injury, and damages to a company's brand value are not
property interests protected by the Due Process Clause,84 both the agency
and the courts should recognize that the potential complete deprivation of a
company's livelihood and its ability to conduct business is an important
property interest that is protected by the Constitution.85
B. Pre-Deprivation Procedures Available to Small Businesses
Proceeding to the next element of a potentially successful
constitutional challenge to CERCLA, the question becomes whether the
process that the government provides sufficiently protects the parties who

80. See Topol, supra note 17, at 2 (stating that according to the EPA, businesses file
for bankruptcy protection for economic reasons that most often have nothing to do with
environmental liabilities though there are some notable exceptions).
81. See 141 CONG. REC. S15844 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler)
(describing the plight of the Ace Steel & Metals company under CERCLA).
82. See id. (describing the liability faced by Ace Steel and Recycling under
CERCLA).
83. See id. (mentioning the small business‘s choice of fighting the EPA‘s
determination or going out of business).
84. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 20 (D.D.C. 2009) (describing EPA‘s
argument that "consequential" deprivations of property, e.g., those that result because the
market values a company less after it receives a UAO than it did before, such as a decrease
in stock price, could not be the basis for a due process challenge).
85. Cf. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1991) (finding a sufficient
deprivation of private property to warrant due process protection when a state‘s action
clouded an individual‘s title, tainted the individual‘s credit rating, and reduced the
individual‘s chances of obtaining a home equity loan or an additional mortgage).
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are deprived of their property interest.86 In the enforcement of CERCLA,
the only processes that are provided by the EPA are the opportunity to
respond to the agency's general notice letter by submitting comments to the
agency and the opportunity to engage in settlement negotiations.87
Assuming the counterfactual report prepared by GE's expert witness is
accurate, around 7% of businesses that are assessed environmental
liabilities under CERCLA end up either in bankruptcy or simply shut down
as a direct collateral effect of the EPA's enforcement.88 Using statistics
taken from General Electric IV and from the Government Accountability
Office, this Note has come up with a rough estimate that about 9% of
businesses assessed liabilities under CERCLA end up in bankruptcy.89 If
the procedures provided by the agency were in fact adequate to protect a
PRP's property interests, then it seems that businesses should not be driven
out of business with only an opportunity to comment on the EPA's decision.
Based on the estimates in the counterfactual and in this Note, it seems quite
possible that the procedures provided by the EPA are in fact insufficient to
protect the property interests of smaller businesses assessed liabilities under
CERCLA.90
Finally, assuming both that CERCLA does act to deprive this class of
PRPs of a significant private property interest that is not purely financial,
and that the pre-deprivation process that the government provides is
inadequate, the final requirement for a potentially successful constitutional

86. See Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 11, at 217 (citing Reardon v. United States,
947 F.2d 1509, 1515 n.10, 1520 (1st Cir. 1991)) (stating the importance of a lack of predeprivation procedures for a potentially successful constitutional challenge to CERCLA after
Reardon).
87. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (describing the process that EPA
follows in assessing liabilities to PRPs under CERCLA);
see also U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 36, at 7 (describing the settlement procedures EPA
implements when a PRP apparently cannot pay for the cost of a cleanup without being
subjected to undue financial hardships).
88. See Expert Report of John Geweke, supra note 72, at ¶¶ 21–22 (giving his
estimation that 7.6% of businesses assessed an environmental liability may end up in
bankruptcy or going out of business entirely).
89. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
90. But see General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (giving at least two examples
where the EPA made errors in issuing a UAO but then either withdrew the order or was
enjoined from enforcing the order through a challenge brought in a parallel cost recovery
action); 141 Cong. Rec. S15844 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler) (noting
that three and a half years after the original letter threatening liability for Ace Steel and
Recycling, the EPA settled with another party and removed Ace from the case, apparently
ending Ace‘s potential liability for a $47,000 contribution).
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challenge to CERCLA is a showing that the provisions that delay judicial
review actually operate to preclude review altogether.91
C. CERCLA's Preclusion of Judicial Review
Three major consequences of CERCLA liability contribute to the
conclusion that judicial review is effectively precluded for small businesses
ordered to clean up sites or contribute funds to the clean-up: first, the
extremely high cost of remedial actions are likely enough in and of
themselves to deplete a small business's assets and the imposition of such a
large liability can scare creditors away from continued financing of the
business;92 second, even if the amount of the clean-up itself does not
deplete a company's assets, the possible imposition of huge penalties for
noncompliance is likely to substantially diminish the company's assets and
handicap the business's ability to secure financing;93 finally, the length of
time it takes for the EPA to conduct remedial actions and seek payment
from the small business is likely to push any chance for review well into the
future.94 When the length of time it takes to obtain review is coupled with a
potentially massive overhanging environmental liability, it becomes
extremely unlikely that all small businesses affected by the statute will be
able to continue operations long enough to challenge an order. When
viewed as a whole, the result is that small businesses may be entirely

91. See Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 11, at 217 (stating that "‗where the effect of a
ban on pre-enforcement review is to preclude review altogether,‘ or throw it ‗so far into the
future as to render it inadequate,‘" the statute may be unconstitutional (quoting Reardon v.
United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1515 n.10, 1520 (1st Cir. 1991))).
92. See 141 CONG. REC. S15844 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1995) (statement Sen. Pressler)
(stating that the liability that EPA sought to impose on Ace Steel and Recycling exceeded
the company‘s entire profits for the year); Expert Report of John Geweke, supra note 72, at
¶ 24 (stating that for six of eighty-nine companies who did not comply with a UAO issued in
his counterfactual, the increased cost of financing the company through the issuance of
bonds was equivalent to a company going from an A credit rating to a BB credit rating (a
"junk" rating)).
93. See Expert Report of John Geweke, supra note 72, at ¶ 24 (explaining the
increased costs of financing for companies that were issued UAOs and failed to comply in
the counterfactual he performed for the GE litigation).
94. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2462, 9613(g)(2) (giving the EPA five years to bring an
enforcement action against a PRP who violates a UAO and giving the EPA either three years
or six years after the completion of a removal or remediation to file an action requiring a
PRP to contribute to the costs of clean up); General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 31
(finding an expert‘s report that the average time it takes to complete remedial action is three
years to be persuasive but failing to find that the EPA unilaterally delays enforcement
proceedings to delay review of UAOs issued to PRPs).
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deprived of the chance to challenge a liability assessed by the EPA under
CERCLA.
D. The Combined Effects of CERCLA on Small Businesses
The first factor that contributes to small businesses being precluded
from challenging EPA orders under CERCLA is that liabilities imposed
under the statute are often huge when compared to a small business's
operations.95 In the example of Ace Steel & Recycling in South Dakota, the
company's assessed liability of $47,000 was greater than the company's
profits for the year.96 The owner of the company asserted that, had it been
unable to remove that overhanging liability from the EPA, he would
certainly have gone out of business.97 Although there is little empirical
evidence on this matter, it is highly unlikely that Ace Steel and Recycling's
story is the only one of its kind; in fact, Bill Huebner suggested that as of
1995, "20,000 small and medium-sized businesses, community groups, and
other organizations" had been implicated in some way under CERCLA.98
The fact that the average Superfund Site has now been calculated to cost
about $12 million to clean up further illustrates the massive costs that small
business can face under the statute.99 When a small business is assessed
even a fraction of that cost, it is unlikely to be able to conduct the cleanup
itself or pay the high costs of the clean up.100
If a small business cannot meet the liability that the EPA assesses and
wants to contest the EPA's decision then, its only option is to refuse to settle
with the EPA, receive a UAO, and refuse to comply with the EPA's order to
clean up the site.101 But because the cost of financing increases, and can

95. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 38 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that if a PRP
complies with an order, the average cost to the PRP is $4 million but that if a PRP does not
comply, the average costs are "substantial but unclear").
96. See 141 Cong. Rec. S15844 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler)
(showing that the liability assessed to Ace by the EPA was greater than the company‘s
profits for the year).
97. See id. (suggesting that the company had the choice of either fighting the liability
being imposed or going out of business).
98. Id.
99. See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 36, at 8 (2005) (stating that
the average cleanup costs associated with the 1,236 sites on the National Priorities List as of
September 30, 2004 was $12 million).
100. Cf. 141 Cong. Rec. S15844 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler)
(mentioning that Ace Steel and Recycling, as a small business, did not have "an extra
$47,000 to spare" to help pay for the cleanup of a hazardous waste site).
101. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2009) (indicating the
choice that a PRP is faced with if it wishes to challenge the EPA‘s order).
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increase substantially,102 when a PRP refuses to comply with a UAO, a
small business may not be able to continue to secure the funds it needs to
keep its doors open. Returning to the counterfactual prepared for the GE
litigation, for 6 of 89 companies that refused to comply with a UAO in the
hypothetical, the difference in the cost of financing after the decision not to
comply was the same as if the company's bonds went from an A, or
investment grade, credit rating to a BB, or "junk," credit rating.103 If a
small company is unable to obtain financing at a previously available rate,
or is unable to obtain financing at all, this of course increases the likelihood
that the company will lose the ability to carry on day-to-day operations and
subsequently increases the likelihood that the company will be forced out of
business as it waits for the opportunity to challenge the EPA's order.104
The conclusion that small businesses are likely to be unable to find
financing after receiving an order from the EPA is reinforced by the
potential for treble damages and the possibility of up to nearly $1 million a
month in fines for a business that fails to comply with an EPA order.105 If
the EPA had not settled with another PRP and instead sought to enforce the
liability against Bill Huebner's company, Ace Steel & Recycling, the EPA
could have sought not only the $47,000 of clean-up costs, but also over
$140,000 in treble damages plus fines of thousands of dollars per day for as
long as the company did not comply with the order.106 By increasing
liability in such a way, the statute and the EPA are essentially forcing
companies of a certain size either to settle or "bet the company" that a judge
will find the company is not liable under CERCLA. It is impossible to
conclude anything other than that such a scheme makes sure that any small
business facing an order from the EPA has its entire livelihood threatened
by the treble damages and fines allowed under the statute.
102. See Expert Report of John Geweke, supra note 72, at ¶ 24 (asserting that in the
counterfactual he performed for the GE litigation, the increased costs of financing for some
companies that received UAOs and failed to comply were equivalent to the increased
financing costs that would result from a company going from an A credit rating to a BB
rating).
103. See id. (concluding that the cost of bond yields for companies who do not comply
with a UAO is substantial).
104. See id. ¶ 25 (stating that for a firm refusing to comply with a UAO, there will be
an increased cost of servicing debt; if the firm is already in a financially precarious position,
the result of noncompliance will be the cancellation of ongoing projects, the reduction of the
workforce, and possibly bankruptcy).
105. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b),
9607(c)(3)) (acknowledging that CERCLA allows the EPA to seek treble damages and fines
of $32,500 per day that a PRP fails to comply with a UAO, which is $975,000 per month).
106. See id. (describing the penalties for refusing to comply with an EPA order under
CERCLA).
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The last hurdle to clear for a potentially successful CERCLA
challenge is to show that the provisions that delay judicial review actually
preclude review entirely.107 That is highly likely in the case of smaller
companies because a small business that wishes to combat an order will
face the consequences of refusing to comply, including possible
bankruptcy, as soon as the business decides not to comply with the order.108
On the other hand, the average time for the EPA to complete remedial work
and seek contribution from a PRP is now over four years.109
This leads to a situation where smaller companies are faced with a "bet
the company" liability that can only be challenged after an average of four
years.110 The question then is: under these circumstances, do CERCLA's
judicial review provisions only operate to delay review or do they, in
reality, preclude review altogether? Based on the evidence from GE's
counterfactuals, from the number of UAOs issued, and from the number of
businesses with CERCLA liabilities that go bankrupt, it is likely that, at
least for some smaller companies, the provisions of CERCLA that purport
to delay judicial review actually operate to preclude review altogether.
Thus, small businesses that are named as PRPs and assessed environmental
liabilities under CERCLA are the parties who are most likely to be able to
show the three elements needed for a potentially successful constitutional
challenge to CERCLA.111
Again, the interests that these businesses are deprived of go beyond
the purely financial, as there appears to be a very real possibility that at
least some class of PRPs are likely to be driven completely out of business
by such an order.112 Next, even though the EPA provides an opportunity
for a PRP assessed with a liability to comment before depriving that
business of those property interests, this level of review is inadequate to
protect the property interests of these small businesses with environmental
liabilities, as these companies are still likely to be forced into bankruptcy
107. See Gerrard & Goldberg , supra note 11 (declaring that "‗where the effect of a ban
on pre-enforcement review is to preclude review altogether,‘ or throw it ‗so far into the
future as to render it inadequate,‘" the statute may be unconstitutional (quoting Reardon v.
United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1515 n.10, 1520 (1st Cir. 1991))).
108. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12 (D.D.C. 2009) (describing the
penalties available under CERCLA and explaining that daily fines can be imposed from the
day the EPA issues the order up until the day the EPA brings an enforcement action against
the company, which it is not required to do for up to six years).
109. See id. at 8 (citing Expert Report of Shahrokh Rouhani at ¶ 6.1.3.4, General
Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 00-2855), 2007 WL 6148046) (giving the
average time it takes for a party to complete a remedial action and seek contribution).
110. Id.
111. See supra notes 64–110 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 64–85 and accompanying text.
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before they are given a legitimate chance, before a neutral third party, to
challenge the EPA's imposition of liability.113 Finally, because a PRP is
likely to face the consequences of refusing to comply with a UAO,
including bankruptcy, when it makes the decision not to comply, the
judicial review provisions that delay review for an average of four years
after the PRP refuses to comply with the order impermissibly operate to
entirely preclude review for this class of PRPs.114
IV. Current Litigation: Why Large Corporations Struggle to Successfully
Challenge the Constitutionality of CERCLA
The arguments above are premised on the idea that the three elements
of a potentially successful constitutional challenge fit into the precedential
decisions of the court considering the challenge. In fact, these elements are
transferable and can be used to show both that the EPA's enforcement of
CERCLA violates the Due Process Clause as set forth in Ex parte Young115
and that greater procedures are required when the EPA enforces CERCLA
against small businesses under Mathews v. Eldridge.116 In this section of
113. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
115. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908) (holding that the provisions of the
act which provided for enormous financial penalties and imprisonment for defendants that
unsuccessfully challenged the act were unconstitutional). In this famous case, the Minnesota
legislature passed laws imposing certain rates on the carriage of freight on some of the
railways throughout the state. See id. at 127. The laws imposed fines of between $2,500
and $5,000 for any corporation that violated the imposed rate structure for the first offense
and fines of between $5,000 and $10,000 for any subsequent offense. Id. The legislature
later passed laws providing that any officer, agent, or representative of a railway company
that violated the statutory rate structure could be fined up to $5,000 and sentenced to up to 5
years in prison. Id. at 128. Shareholders of the railroad companies covered by the statute
sued in federal court in an effort to prevent the railroads from complying with the law and to
prevent the state from enforcing the law. Id. at 129–31. In the circuit court, the Attorney
General of Minnesota, Edward Young, was enjoined from enforcing the law against the
railroad companies. Id. at 131. The day after the injunction was issued, Young brought suit
in state court against the railroad companies and sought an order to have them comply with
the law, and the circuit court ultimately held Young in contempt of court for violating the
injunction issued in the federal court. Id.at 133. In reviewing the case and Young's
detention on appeal, the Supreme Court first found that the federal courts had jurisdiction
over whether the rates published by the Minnesota legislature were so low as to be
confiscatory. Id. at 144–45. The Court then held that the provisions of the act that imposed
enormous fines and possible imprisonment as the penalties for noncompliance with the rate
structure were facially unconstitutional, regardless of whether the actual rate schedule was
confiscatory or not. Id. at 148.
116. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (concluding that an
evidentiary review was not required before an agency could terminate an individual's
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the Note, the focus is on fitting these arguments into the mold of past
precedent and the current litigation challenging the constitutionality of
CERCLA. This section will also highlight some of the key differences
between the arguments for small businesses that CERCLA violates their
constitutional rights and the arguments that have been tried by large
corporations and rejected by the courts.
This will be accomplished by first discussing the General Electric
cases and the problems that the courts have noted with GE's arguments.117
Then, this section will discuss how the arguments above fit into the
requirements of Young and Mathews to show that for a certain class of
PRPs, the enforcement of CERCLA by the EPA results in serious
constitutional violations that have been continuously overlooked in the
courts, including in the most recent round of litigation.118
A. Overview of the General Electric Litigation
Since the enactment of CERCLA in 1980, GE has been subject to at
least 68 orders from the EPA to clean up hazardous waste sites, presumably
after settlement negotiations had failed and the agency had determined that
GE was responsible for the contamination at the site.119 At the time of this
writing, GE states that it has some involvement with 89 sites on the EPA's

disability benefits). An individual, Eldridge, was originally awarded disability benefits
pursuant to the Social Security Act. Id. at 323. The state agency that monitored Eldridge's
medical condition sent him a questionnaire and, after receiving the results, determined that
the individual's disability had ceased in May 1972. Id. at 324. After Eldridge's disability
benefits were terminated, he filed a suit seeking to reinstate his benefits because the
procedures provided to him before his benefits were terminated were inadequate. Id. at 324–
25. The district court and court of appeals agreed with Mr. Eldridge and enjoined the
termination of his benefits until after an evidentiary hearing could be held, but the Supreme
Court reversed. Id. at 325–26. The Court stated that the specific level of process that is due
when the government deprives individuals of interests depends on three distinct factors: (1)
the private action that will be affected by the government's action; (2) the risk that the
procedures used will lead to inappropriate deprivations and the probable value, if any, of
adding any extra procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest including the
costs and administrative burdens to the Government of imposing additional procedural
safeguards. Id. at 335. After considering all of these factors, the Court determined that
additional procedures were not required before the Social Security Administration could
make its determination that Eldridge was no longer disabled.
117. See Infra Part IV.A.
118. See Infra Part IV.B.
119. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 17 (D.D.C. 2009) (acknowledging that
GE has been issued 68 unilateral administrative orders by the EPA and complied with all of
them).
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Superfund National Priorities List (NPL),120 a list reserved for sites that
pose the greatest threat to human health and the environment.121 And from
1990 through 2009, GE spent over $1.7 billion on the cleanup of three
hazardous waste sites alone.122 Under CERCLA then, GE has been ordered
by the government to clean up dozens of sites and spend well over a billion
dollars, but the company was never entitled to a hearing on the propriety of
the government's orders before complying.
In November of 2000, GE launched a broad constitutional attack
against CERCLA. GE's suit challenged the constitutionality of CERCLA,
specifically the EPA's use of the UAO provision (§ 106 of CERCLA). 123
This decade-long lawsuit recently came to an apparent final resolution in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.124
Over the years, multiple preliminary issues in the case have been resolved
at both the district court and circuit court level, including GE's challenge
that the statute was facially invalid.125 The most recent decision held that
the EPA's "pattern and practice" of enforcing the unilateral administrative
order provision of CERCLA did not operate to deprive GE or other

120. See GE Citizenship: Programs & Activities, Environment, Remedial
Responsibilities,
http://www.ge.com/citizenship/programs-activities/environment/remedialresponsibilities.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (stating the number of Superfund sites on
the NPL that GE is currently involved with) (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate,
and Environment).
121. See Healey, supra note 17, at 277 (describing how the NPL was the result of
Congress‘s awareness that funding under CERCLA was inadequate). Cf. 40 C.F.R.
300.425(c) (2009) (listing the criteria for a release to be on the NPL).
122. See GE Citizenship: Programs & Activities, Environment, Remedial
Responsibilities,
http://www.ge.com/citizenship/programs-activities/environment/remedialresponsibilities.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (describing the expenses incurred dredging
three river sites that the EPA concluded GE was responsible for polluting with carcinogenic
compounds) (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and Environment). But see
General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 30 (reporting that GE repeatedly stated that
environmental costs were not material to its "financial positions, . . . , results of operations,
or liquidity" (quoting GE Annual Reports, 1997–2000)).
123. See General Electric IV, F. Supp. 2d at 12 (giving the procedural history of the
lawsuit, specifically that GE filed its complaint in November 2000 and amended the
complaint to challenge CERCLA in two ways in March 2001).
124. See General Electric V, 610 F.3d 110, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming the district
court's decisions that neither the CERCLA statute itself nor the EPA's practice of enforcing
the statute violates the Constitution).
125. See General Electric II, 360 F. 3d 188, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding the plain
meaning of the CERCLA statute did not prevent GE‘s facial constitutional challenge from
being considered).
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potentially responsible parties of Due Process under either Ex Parte Young
or Eldridge v. Mathews.126
1. Ex parte Young & Large Businesses
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court announced the rule that a
statute violates Due Process if the penalties it imposes for noncompliance
are so severe that companies are prevented from seeking judicial review of
the legislation.127 Courts have often had the opportunity to consider
challenges to the facial validity of the steep fines that may be imposed
under CERCLA, and the provisions have always been upheld because the
implementation of fines under the statute can be avoided if the PRP had
sufficient cause to refuse to comply with the order, and additionally, the
imposition of fines is always subject to judicial discretion.128
So the first important reason that the district court in General Electric
IV concluded that the EPA's use of UAOs under CERCLA is consistent
with Young was that PRPs can avoid liability for the fines that result from
the violation of an order issued by the EPA if there is a "sufficient cause"
for the failure to comply.129 According to the court, this provision
expressly allows potentially responsible parties to avoid the imposition of
penalties that can be levied for failing to comply with an order issued by the
EPA if it can show that the party had sufficient cause to avoid compliance
with the order.130 Since the court determined that parties may refuse to
comply with a UAO issued by the EPA, it was able to determine that there

126. See General Electric V, 610 F.3d at 127–129 (setting forth GE's arguments that
CERCLA and the EPA's administration of CERCLA violate Due Process and "quickly
disposing" of the company's arguments that the statute violated Due Process).
127. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908) (invalidating a Minnesota
regulatory regime that imposed severe fines and potential prison time for railroad companies
and executives that charged more than the state-mandated rates for rail transportation). See
also General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 17 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing the circumstances
when statutes can be declared unconstitutional under Young and its progeny).
128. See, e.g., General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (citing numerous cases that
have held that the "sufficient cause defense" contained in the CERCLA statute operates as a
good faith safe harbor and cures any potential constitutional violations under Young).
129. See id. (focusing on the fact that liability and fines for violating an order issued by
the EPA under CERCLA can only be imposed by an Article III judge and only if the PRP
violated the order "without sufficient cause").
130. See id. at 17–18 (explaining that these provisions provide enough security that
parties challenging the statute in good faith will not be punished for the statutory scheme to
withstand scrutiny under Ex Parte Young); See also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(b)(1) (2006) (allowing
for the imposition of penalties on a party who violates an EPA order only if the party
violates the order "without sufficient cause").
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was no constitutional problem posed by the Superfund Act under Young.131
This reasoning is consistent with numerous decisions of other courts,132 but
most of these decisions dealt with large companies who were likely
relatively unaffected by their environmental liabilities rather than small
businesses whose existence could be jeopardized by the imposition of
environmental liabilities.133
2. Mathews v. Eldridge & Large Businesses
The district court in General Electric IV then went on to determine
whether the implication of liabilities and use of UAOs by the EPA violated
the due process framework of Mathews.134 The district court recognized that
even companies that comply with an order issued by the EPA suffer
deprivations of a private property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause and have no opportunity for a hearing before the deprivation
occurs.135 The court then determined that the private interests implicated by
131. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 17 (D.D.C. 2009) (deciding that the
sufficient cause defense in CERCLA satisfies the rule that if a party can challenge the statute
in good faith without the imposition of penalties, then the statute may be constitutional under
Young).
132. See Emp‘rs Ins. of Wausau v. Browner, 52 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir.1995) (refusing
to allow a company to seek reimbursement for its clean-up costs until after it has completely
cleaned up a contaminated site, even when that company is not responsible for any of the
remaining contaminants); Solid State Circuits Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir. 1987)
("[T]o pass constitutional requirements, the standard must provide parties served with EPA
clean-up orders a real and meaningful opportunity to test the validity of the order."); Wagner
Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 316 (2d Cir.1986) (seeing plainly that there cannot be a
violation of the Due Process Clause if the imposition of financial penalties is subject to
judicial discretion and if there is a "good faith exception" to the penalty provisions of the
statutes); United States v. Capital Tax Corp., 2007 WL 488084 at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(explaining that CERCLA is constitutional in part because of two safety nets provided in the
statute including a "sufficient cause" defense and the ability to comply and then seek
reimbursement from the government).
133. See, e.g., General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 30 ("[F]or other companies, like
GE, UAOs are ‗not material to financial positions, results of operations, or liquidity.‘"
(quoting GE‘s annual financial reports from 1997–2000)); Employers Insurance, 52 F.3d
664 (highlighting that the company did not claim that it would have been unreasonable or
unduly burdensome for the company to "shell out another couple of hundred thousand
dollars to complete the clean-up project" and that the business had thousands of employees
and annual revenues of over a billion dollars).
134. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 20 ("That brings us to the primary due
process challenge GE asserts, which must be assessed within the framework of Mathews v.
Eldridge.").
135. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (recognizing that whether PRPs
comply with a UAO or not, they are deprived of some private property interest that is
protected by the Constitution).
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EPA action under CERCLA are generally primarily financial but have
enough potential collateral effects to "constitute weighty private
interests."136 Nevertheless, the court determined that the size and nature of
the private interests of the PRP do not justify the greater expense that would
have to be incurred by the agency to provide greater procedural safeguards
when the reduction that would be achieved in the potential risk of error by
those safeguards is relatively small.137
This decision seems correct as far as its decision applies to GE and
other large companies. The fact is that large corporations like GE can
conduct clean-ups, bear the expenses that go along with decontaminating
hazardous waste sites, and then challenge any potential errors made by the
government after the fact if it wants to ensure that the large corporation's
financial interests are protected.138 While UAOs directed at large
companies may cause financial problems and lead to unwelcome expenses,
the fact that the government needs to facilitate quick and effective
responses to hazardous waste sites to protect the public health provides
enough of a justification for delaying review until the site has been
decontaminated.139
If there is a problem with the decisions issued in the GE litigation, it is
that they apply equally as well to the EPA's administration of the statute
against small businesses.140 Instead of applying one broad finding to the
EPA's administration of the statute, it is necessary to recognize that the
enforcement of the act against different classes of PRPs results in different
consequences. Quite simply, when compared to the effect an enforcement
action has against companies like GE, the act affects smaller businesses
completely differently; small businesses are deprived of a different type of
property interest and they are, in reality, precluded from ever challenging
136. Id. at 30–31.
137. See id. at 37–39 (conducting a balancing of the factors required when analyzing
due process claims under the Mathews framework and deciding that the increased
protections of a PRP‘s property interests were not warranted because such process would
greatly increase the burden on the government and not greatly reduce the risk of error).
138. See id. at 30 ("[F]or other companies, like GE, UAOs are ‗not material to financial
positions, results of operations, or liquidity.‘" (quoting GE‘s annual financial reports from
1997–2000)).
139. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91–92 (1971) (showing that the Court has
allowed deprivations of property interests in situations requiring prompt action like the
collection of taxes, meeting the needs of the national war effort, and protecting against
misbranded drugs) (citations omitted).
140. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 39 (D.D.C. 2009) (listing the options
for any PRP that wants to challenge an order as either complying with the order and then
seeking review or refusing to comply and defending its behavior in a subsequent judicial
action).
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the UAOs issued against them in front of a neutral decision-maker. Under
both Young and Mathews, the EPA's administration of CERCLA against
small businesses raises greater due process concerns.
B. Due Process and Enforcement Against Small Businesses
1. Ex Parte Young & Small Businesses
Returning to the rule of Ex parte Young, a statute violates Due Process
if the penalties it imposes for noncompliance are so severe that companies
are prevented from seeking judicial review of the legislation.141 In GE's
challenge, the courts determined that CERCLA is not unduly coercive for
two reasons: first, the statute has a sufficient cause defense that insulates a
PRP from treble damages or heavy fines; and second, because the
imposition of fines under the statute is not mandatory but is within an
Article III judge's discretion.142 The effect of these provisions, the court
concluded, was that PRPs were not coerced into complying with the statute
rather than challenging the EPA's actions in court.143 In fact, it appears that
GE and other corporations have not been improperly coerced into
complying with the statute, as plenty of large corporations have filed
numerous suits contesting CERCLA liability.144
However, the district court in General Electric IV never addressed the
coercive effect of the potentially massive liability that can be imposed
through the act for that 7% of companies for which the effect of refusing to
comply with an order will be a greatly increased cost of financing, possible
reductions in workforce, or bankruptcy. For these businesses, the statute's
potential penalties and collateral effects ultimately coerce small businesses
to comply with EPA orders because if they do not, the negative business
141. See id. at 17 (discussing the circumstances when statutes can be declared
unconstitutional under Young and its progeny (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 147
(1908))).
142. See id. 17–19 (deciding that, when combined with the fact that fines under the
statute may only be imposed by Article III judges, the "sufficient cause defense" contained
in the CERCLA statute operates as a good faith safe harbor and cures any potential
constitutional violations under Young).
143. See id. at 19 (summing up that GE did not show that EPA‘s pattern and practice of
enforcing CERCLA was unduly coercive).
144. See id. at 30 ("[F]or other companies, like GE, UAOs are ‗not material to financial
positions, results of operations, or liquidity.‘" (quoting GE‘s annual financial reports from
1997–2000)); Emp‘rs Ins. of Wausau v. Browner, 52 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir.1995) ("It is a
large company with thousands of employees, and its annual revenues from premiums exceed
$1 billion."). See also cases cited supra note 9 (listing numerous challenges to CERCLA
brought by companies like GE, Employers Insurance or Wausau, Goodrich, and Raytheon).
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effects will be felt immediately while any opportunity to challenge the
EPA's action will be delayed for years.145
In some ways, the EPA has already recognized this problem. When it
comes to collecting liabilities, the agency "often settles environmental
claims with businesses for less than the cleanup costs if paying for the
cleanup would present ‗undue financial hardship,‘ such as depriving a
business of ordinary and necessary assets or resulting in an inability to pay
for ordinary and necessary business expenses."146 Despite this apparent
kindness by the EPA, the fact is the agency's settlement practices cannot
cure the coercive effect that exists when a business still faces liability for
full clean-up costs, treble damages, and extremely large fines.147 Instead of
allowing the provision of additional safeguards for such companies to
remain a generous gesture, the courts should in fact recognize that when the
statute is applied to a certain set of businesses, the effect is unduly coercive
and therefore unconstitutional.
2. Mathews v. Eldridge and Small Businesses
Now returning to Mathews, the Court established that the procedural
protections that the government must provide to satisfy the due process
requirement of the Fifth Amendment depend on the importance of the
private property interest at stake, the government's interest in maintaining
the procedures that it has in place, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of
property through the procedures already in place and the probable value, if
any, of providing additional procedures.148 The court in General Electric
IV determined that the private property interests at stake when CERCLA is
enforced through UAOs were "less constitutionally significant" because
they were primarily financial.149 Additionally, it found that forcing the
government to provide greater procedural protections would generate a
substantial impairment of the government's interest in avoiding greater
145. See supra Part III.D. (describing how the enforcement of CERCLA against small
businesses deprives those entities of valuable personal property rights and how the judicial
review provisions push delay so far into the future that small businesses assessed
environmental liabilities may be precluded of review entirely).
146. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 99, at 7 (2005).
147. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘n, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (clarifying that an
administrative agency cannot cure an unlawful delegation of power by Congress by refusing
to exercise some of that power).
148. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (laying out the three factors
that determine the amount of procedural due process required in a given situation).
149. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 30 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Financial
deprivations are less troubling because money can be recouped in a post-deprivation
hearing.").
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procedures because of the high "financial and administrative costs" of
providing more review.150 Finally, the court determined that the risk of
erroneous deprivation was small and that greater procedural protections
were unlikely to have a substantial impact on reducing the risk of error.151
Now, under the court's analysis, the procedural protections provided
by the EPA do appear sufficient to protect the less constitutionally
significant purely financial interests of large corporations like GE. But two
differences between the effect that CERCLA enforcement has on small
businesses and the effect it has on large corporations suggest that greater
procedures should be provided to protect small businesses.
First, the property interests of small businesses are not purely financial
and thus are more constitutionally significant than the property interests of
large corporations that are impacted by the EPA's enforcement of
CERCLA.152 Second, because the need for greater procedural protections is
limited to the class of PRPs made up of small businesses, a court could
limit the financial and administrative costs that must be incurred by the
EPA in providing greater procedural protections. Ultimately, when the
Mathews test is recalibrated and considers the importance of the private
property interests of small businesses that are impacted under CERCLA as
well as the lower cost for the government in providing greater procedures to
this relatively small class of PRPs, it may well be the case that the EPA's
enforcement of CERCLA against small businesses requires greater
procedural protections than are provided when the act is enforced against
the class of larger corporate PRPs.
V. Proposed Solutions to the Small Business Problem
This section of the Note considers two different steps that could be
taken that could lead to the EPA enforcing CERCLA in a way that protects
the private property interests of small businesses in the face of the daunting
liabilities that can be incurred in CERCLA. The first step would be for the
courts that do accept jurisdiction over a pattern and practice challenge to the
administration of CERCLA to recognize that the statute has different effects
150. Id. at 33 (noting also that because the government only issues UAOs after
settlement negotiations have failed, it is likely that almost every PRP would seek preenforcement review of the EPA‘s action against it, which would result in very high costs for
the government).
151. See id. at 38 (stating that greater procedural protections would be unlikely to
reduce the risk of error because the risk was already very small).
152. See id. at 29 ("Deprivations that can be recouped after a hearing—like purely
financial deprivations—are less significant than irreparable deprivations.") (citations
omitted).
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when applied against different classes of parties. As a result, when
determining the coercive effect of EPA's administration of the statute and
the procedural protections that are due PRPs, courts should look beyond the
facial validity of the statute and act to protect those PRPs who are the most
vulnerable to unconstitutional deprivations because of the EPA's
enforcement of the act. The second step would be for some sort of
legislative action to be taken, either through official agency rulemaking or
through Congress, so that this class of vulnerable PRPs is not completely
precluded from challenging an agency action that deprives them of
important private property interests.
A. Federal Courts Should Recognize Procedural Protections for Some
PRPs Assessed with Environmental Liabilities Under CERCLA
When courts do accept jurisdiction over pattern and practice
challenges to the EPA's enforcement of CERCLA, they should consider the
different effects that the act has when enforced against different kinds of
PRPs.153 A pattern and practice challenge is a more systemic challenge
than an as-applied challenge but more fact-specific than a facial
challenge;154 it follows that the courts should focus on the different types of
companies that are adversely affected by the EPA's practice of enforcing
CERCLA, rather than taking a one-size-fits-all approach and concluding
that because the act is constitutional when enforced against large
corporations, it is constitutional when enforced against anyone.
The error of taking a one-size-fits-all approach when considering the
constitutionality of the EPA's enforcement of CERCLA is, again, that small
businesses will find themselves without any recourse to challenge adverse
EPA action before a neutral decision-maker.155 These businesses simply
will not have the ability to comply with an expensive order to clean up the
hazardous waste sites that are governed by CERCLA; 156 nor is it possible to
expect that each of these businesses will be able to continue operations after
153. See General Electric IV, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (citing Mcnary v. Haitian Refugee
Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991)) (verifying that a pattern and practice claim is not analyzed
under the same test that applies to facial challenges).
154. See id. (pointing out that GE was not challenging the application of the statute in a
hypothetical situation but was challenging the EPA‘s actual administration).
155. See supra Part III.D (showing that the costs of noncompliance with a UAO will be
felt by small businesses immediately and include the threat of bankruptcy while the ability to
challenge an order will be delayed for three years on average).
156. Cf. 141 Cong. Rec. S15844 (daily ed. Oct. 26,1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler)
(giving the plight of one small business that the EPA sought to hold accountable under
CERCLA by imposing a liability so large there was little chance the business would be able
to pay it).
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refusing to comply with an order from the EPA long enough to mount a
defense in an enforcement action brought by the EPA.157 Ultimately,
considering that when compared to large corporations, there is a class of
PRPs for which the effects of CERCLA liability are more serious, for
which the availability of treble damages and large fines provide a greater
coercive effect, and for which judicial review of agency action may be
precluded entirely, courts considering the EPA's administration of the
statute should distinguish between the EPA's practice of assessing
environmental liabilities against small businesses and the agency's
enforcement practices against large corporations.
B. How a Statutory Amendment or Agency Rulemaking Could Ensure
Heightened Protections for Small Businesses
In the second option, the agency or Congress could moot any pattern
and practice challenge by adopting a rule or passing legislation that requires
the EPA to provide a pre-enforcement hearing when it seeks to impose
liabilities against PRPs of a certain size. In the most recent amendments to
CERCLA, Congress acted to protect small businesses and used definitions
from the Small Business Act to ensure that small businesses and small nonprofit organizations could not be held liable for the contribution of
household trash products to a hazardous waste site.158 It follows that the
agency could use similar definitions and make additional procedural
protections available, including some type of hearing before a neutral
decision-maker, when it seeks to impose liability on a business that
employs a certain number of individuals or for which the liability sought to
be imposed is greater than the annual profits of the business, or even of the
business's total assets.159 Such a rule would do more to protect the interests
of the most vulnerable parties that are subject to CERCLA enforcement,
and it would place less of a burden on the agency than extending predeprivation protections to all PRPs assessed liabilities under the act.
If the EPA does not choose to follow that path and provide greater
procedural protections for small businesses, then it would be up to Congress
157. See supra Part III.D (concluding that since the effects of noncompliance will be
felt right away while review is delayed for a substantial period of time, judicial review of
agency action against small businesses is unlikely).
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(o), (p) (2001) (excluding individuals from liability who can
demonstrate the amount of waste they contributed to a site was minimal).
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(p) (citing 15 U.S.C. §631) (2006) (allowing for an exception
to liability under CERCLA for businesses that were small business concerns and that
employed, on average, 100 or fewer full-time employees per year for the three years
preceding notification of liability).
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to act and amend the Superfund Act to provide greater procedural
protections for small businesses and individuals. Such an amendment could
simply extend the protections Congress passed in 2001 and ensure that preenforcement procedures before a neutral decision maker are allowed for
small businesses.160 If Congress wanted to go further when the EPA seeks
to impose liability against small businesses, there are other ways it could do
so.
Because of the distinct risk that the issuance of a single UAO can
drive a small business into bankruptcy, Congress could force the EPA to
seek an order from a district court under § 106(a) of CERCLA when it
desires to hold these businesses liable for their contributions to hazardous
waste sites.161 While this method has always been available to the EPA as
an enforcement method, at least one PRP has claimed that the agency has
not used it since the late 1980s because district courts frequently sided with
PRPs.162 By completely eliminating the availability of UAOs as an
enforcement method against small businesses, Congress could ensure that
the private property interests of a vulnerable class of PRPs are protected to
the greatest extent possible under the statute.
VI. Conclusion
In conclusion, the goal of this Note was to show how the enforcement
of CERCLA against smaller businesses, as a class, leads to serious
constitutional concerns that can be easily overlooked by the courts. It has
been shown that small businesses are deprived of significant private
property interests that go beyond the purely financial, that the predeprivation procedures currently provided are not adequate enough to
protect these interests, and that the effect of these deprivations and the
judicial review provisions of CERCLA can entirely preclude any chance the
business would have of gaining review of the government's action before an
impartial decision-maker. The result is that small businesses should be able
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (2006) (describing the appropriate inquiries for the
administrator to establish that the defendant has satisfied CERLCA requirements).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2006) (allowing the agency to seek to enforce CERCLA
liabilities either through pursuing a district court order against the PRP or through issuing a
UAO).
162. See General Electric Co.‘s Mot. for Summ. J. & Mem. of Law in Supp. Thereof at
33–34, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F.Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 00-2855), 2007 WL
5022421 (asserting that after the cases of United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460 (W.D.
Okla. 1990) aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992) and
United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990) were decided against the
EPA, the agency stopped bringing judicial enforcement actions under § 106 of CERCLA).
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to mount significant due process challenges to the enforcement of CERCLA
under both Ex parte Young and Mathews v. Eldridge.
Under Young, the due process concerns stem from the fact that small
businesses are unable to resort to the courts to test the validity of the
government's action. Despite assurances that the "sufficient cause" defense
and the discretion of an Article III judge in imposing fines are adequate to
protect a PRP who wishes to challenge agency action, the fact is that the
availability of a defense and of a judge's discretion are little comfort when a
business is faced with the question of how to survive long enough to
challenge agency action with questionable financing and operating
prospects caused by looming, unchallengeable environmental liabilities.
While these provisions may cure Ex parte Young problems that CERCLA
faces when it is applied against big businesses, they cannot solve those
same due process concerns when it is a small business on the receiving end
of CERCLA liability.
And under Mathews, the more significant private property interests of
small businesses and the small amount of additional costs that the
government would face in providing additional procedural protections to
this small class of businesses suggest that the EPA is not doing enough to
protect small businesses from the potentially crippling effects of CERCLA
liability. While allowing every PRP that receives a UAO the ability to
challenge agency action before enforcement would be difficult, providing
an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker for the 7–9%
of companies that are most vulnerable under the act seems to be not only
reasonable, but constitutionally required.

